






































































An Incomplete Revolution: 
Corporate Governance Challenges 
of the London Assurance Company 




The London Assurance (LA) was incorporated in 1720, marking a 
significant innovation in the marine insurance industry. Contem-
poraries anticipated joint-stock firms such as the LA would rap-
idly outcompete private underwriters, yet this outcome did not 
occur. The success of the private underwriters has been ascribed 
to their organizational form. This paper reassesses these explana-
tions and finds that, rather than an a priori worse business model, 
various corporate governance challenges limited the LA’s capacity 
to compete. This provides a more complete explanation for the 
relative failure of the joint-stock marine insurance companies and 
has implications for understanding the evolution of the corporate 
form in the eighteenth century.
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Introduction
The floatation of London Assurance (LA) and Royal Exchange Assur-
ance (REA) in 1720 gave rise to fevered speculation. Between January 
1720 and their market peak in the summer of that year, the share 
price of the LA increased by 4320 percent and that of the REA by 
1343 percent; greatly outpacing the price of the South Sea Company 
(SSC), which rose in comparison by only 675 percent.1 Contemporar-
ies saw incorporation as a promising innovation with the potential to 
transform not only the insurance industry, but international trade. It 
was claimed that these enterprises would be able to offer lower rates, 
better guarantees, and quicker processing of claims.2 There were 
high expectations that the two firms would soon outcompete private 
underwriters and capture the rapidly expanding marine insurance 
market.3
Yet the English marine insurance market developed very differently. 
Private underwriters thrived, cooperating to form the powerful orga-
nization that would become Lloyd’s. The two joint-stock companies 
managed to secure only 10 percent of the market when launched, a 
figure that declined to 3 percent in 1810.4
Why, then, did the joint-stock corporations fail to deliver the 
expected innovations and outcompete the private underwriters? 
Answering this question is of interest to economic and business his-
torians, as it contributes to current debates examining why different 
organizational forms emerge, and how they affect firm and economic 
performance.5 Insurance is a particularly interesting industry in 
which to address these questions. Pearson and Yoneyama show that 
different organizational forms have been used across time and geogra-
phy to varying degrees of success.6 The LA, as part of the first wave of 
widespread incorporation within the English economy, offers a perti-
nent case with which to address these debates.
 1. The data are drawn from Frehen, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst, 
“New Evidence on the First Financial Bubble.”
 2. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, “The special report from the [Parliamentary] 
committee appointed to inquire into … all undertakings for purchasing joint 
stocks, or obsolete charters.”
 3. Haines, Chapters of Insurance History, 206. Also, Straus, Lloyd’s: A 
Historical Sketch, 27–28.
 4. A Letter to Jasper Vaux, p. 47, estimates that in 1720 the LA and REA 
represented together 10 percent of the market for shipping and freight, compared 
to only 3 percent in 1810.
 5. Guinanne et al., “Putting the Corporation in Its Place”; Musacchio and 
Turner, “Does the Law and Finance Hypothesis Pass the Test of History?”
 6. Pearson and Yoneyama, Corporate Forms and Organisational Choice in 
International Insurance.
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The historiography of the LA and REA identifies two dominant 
explanations for their relative failure. First, recent explanations focus 
on the agency problems created by the highly discrete nature of the 
risks in marine insurance.7 This placed a premium on organizational 
forms that improved flows of information to mitigate threats of asym-
metric information. The system of networked private underwriting 
was particularly adept at addressing these challenges.8 It also allowed 
for an efficient distribution of risk, with individual underwriters tak-
ing only a percentage of any given insurance line. Lloyd’s improved 
coordination of contracts between individual underwriters, allow-
ing them to respond rapidly to potential business opportunities and 
diversify risk effectively.9 Conversely, the corporations had poorer 
access to information and faced a “lemons problem.”10
Second, it was claimed that the marine corporations tended to 
act with extreme “caution,” restricting the freedom of their under-
writers, which led to higher-priced premiums.11 This was despite 
holding significantly more capital, which potentially allowed the 
insurance of whole lines and offers of lower rates. The failure to 
exploit this advantage must be ascribed to weaknesses within the 
corporations’ shared organizational and business model.12 However, 
no clear explanation for the motivation behind these restrictions has 
been advanced.
There are two significant limitations to these explanations. First, 
they are anachronistic. It is important to note that Lloyd’s was not, 
in 1720, the organized and efficient network it would later become. 
By the early eighteenth century, there was in excess of a 100 private 
underwriters in London, who had amassed extensive experience of 
routes and pricing, and informal networks provided platforms to 
enable coordination. Yet Lloyd’s as a named entity was unknown in 
these years, and its “intelligence apparatus” only reached full devel-
opment in the early nineteenth century.13
 7. Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844”; Westall, 
“Invisible, Visible and ‘Direct’ Hands.”
 8. Kingston (“Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844”), Wright 
and Fayle (A History of Lloyd’s), Straus (Lloyd’s: A Historical Sketch), and Clayton 
(British Insurance) also underline the superior competitiveness of Lloyd’s due to 
its better access and use of information.
 9. John, “The London Assurance Company and the Marine Insurance 
Market,” 133.
 10. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons.’”
 11. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 53; Leonard, “Contingent 
Commitment,” 52–53.
 12. Pearson and Doe, “Organizational Choice in UK Marine Insurance.”
 13. Raynes, A History of British Insurance; Gibb, Lloyd’s of London; Kingston, 
“Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844,” 403; Clayton, British 
Insurance, 52.
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Second, claims about the organizational superiority of the pri-
vate underwriter networks are undermined by the development of 
the marine insurance industry in the United States. In the eigh-
teenth century, American underwriters had followed Lloyd’s 
model.14 However, their limited capital base forced merchants to 
spread their risk between underwriters. Newly formed joint-stock 
firms aggressively exploited this weakness, deliberately leveraging 
their capital advantage to insure entire ships. By 1810, the corpo-
rations had driven private underwriters almost entirely out of the 
market.15
At the time of their foundation, the LA and REA faced strong but 
not insurmountable competition. The U.S. case shows that the joint-
stock companies did not have an a priori worse organizational form 
or business model. Indeed, the success of the U.S. corporations was 
not the consequence of better information, it was rather the result of 
the strategic decision to aggressively exploit their capital advantage. 
This indicates that different organizational forms could succeed in 
the marine insurance sector and suggests the LA and REA had a sim-
ilar opportunity in 1720.
The limitations of these explanations open questions about the 
effects of organizational form on firm performance. Kingston called 
for “further study of the internal organisation of the British corpo-
rations … to understand their comparative advantage and disadvan-
tages relative to private underwriting.”16 This article pursues this line 
of inquiry and asks three questions: Why did entrepreneurs choose to 
use a novel organizational form in the marine insurance market? How 
were the new corporations organized and operated? What explains 
the “failure” of the eighteenth-century joint-stock companies to dom-
inate the marine insurance industry?
In answering these questions the article considers John’s observa-
tion that the structure of the LA, despite being a joint-stock firm, had 
an “absence of any delegated authority to a managerial hierarchy.”17 
Common to the period, the firm was directly managed by owner- 
directors. Yet various parliamentary debates in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries expressed concerns about the allocation of 
rights and responsibilities among shareholders, directors, and man-
agers. Problems of governance related to the constraint of managerial 
preference, the rotation of directors, and conflicts of interest caused 
 14. Crothers, “Commercial Risk and Capital Formation in Early America,” 612.
 15. Crothers, “Commercial Risk and Capital Formation in Early America”; 
Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844.”
 16. Kingston, “Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844,” 406.
 17. John, “The London Assurance Company and the Marine Insurance 
Market,” 131.
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by interlocking directorates were widespread.18 As Freeman and col-
leagues note, this was a period, “when the struggle over the powers of 
directors, who were usually owners, and nondirecting shareholders 
was particularly acute.”19
This article examines how the organization and operations of the LA 
were adapted in response to three significant governance challenges. 
First, the struggle between directors and nondirecting shareholders 
could lead to controlling shareholders using the firm’s assets for pri-
vate benefit at the expense of small shareholders; a threat described 
as minority oppression.20 This problem was particularly acute in the 
case of owner-director–managed companies. There was limited legal 
protection of investor rights in eighteenth-century England, so to 
limit oppression, minority shareholders would have to seek protec-
tion through internal governance mechanisms.
The second challenge relates to the effectiveness of owner-directors 
in managing the firm. The lack of delegated management has been 
identified as a restriction on effective decision making.21 Recent 
research into “busy” non-executive directors posits that multiple 
appointments weaken oversight of management and lead to poorer 
firm performance.22 Supple identified the wide-ranging commercial 
and political interests held by directors of the REA, with interlock-
ing directorates, a common feature of the chartered companies.23 The 
varied commitments of the LA’s owner-directors, subsequent limita-
tions on time, and possible conflicts of interest may have limited their 
capacity to monitor and control operations.
Third, limited liability is widely regarded as the “sine qua non of 
the modern company,” critical in enabling diffuse corporate owner-
ship.24 In eighteenth-century England, limited liability was not legally 
guaranteed, but could be included in the incorporating act.25 A lack 
of limited liability may have motivated large shareholders to exert close 
 18. Freeman, Pearson, and Taylor, Shareholder Democracies?, 77; Wagner, 
The English Chartered Trading Companies, 1688–1763, chap. 3.
 19. Freeman, Pearson, and Taylor, Shareholder Democracies? p.11.
 20. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Corporate Governance and the Plight of 
Minority Shareholders”; Tirole, “Corporate Governance.”
 21. Chandler, Strategy and Structure.
 22. Fich and Shivdasani, “Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?” A counter 
point is presented by Ferris and colleagues, who find no evidence that “busy” 
directors affect firm performance; Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, “Too Busy to 
Mind the Business?”
 23. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 75–79; Wagner, The English 
Chartered Trading Companies, 1688–1763, 114.
 24. Acheson and Turner, “The Impact of Limited Liability on Ownership and 
Control,” 320; Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law.
 25. Harris, Industrializing English Law; Freeman, Pearson; and Taylor, Share-
holder Democracies?, 181–182.
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control of the company and, through the role of owner-managers, protect 
their investments from the risk of company failure and subsequent 
unlimited calls on their assets.
Analysis of the response of the shareholders and directors to these 
challenges is contextualized within eighteenth-century attitudes 
toward corporate governance. Shareholders were expected to be active 
participants in the operations of the company; as Pearson notes, “the 
passive investor was frowned upon.”26 Wider political interests, as 
well as local and national economic concerns, significantly influenced 
the behavior of shareholders.27 The analysis draws on a new data set 
of insurance lines made in the first year of operation, new data on the 
directors’ external connections and personal business with the firm, 
and a number of new qualitative sources detailing the operations of 
the company.
The contribution of the article is twofold. First, it develops a dif-
ferent rationale for the relative failure of the LA, identifying that the 
directors adopted a risk-averse strategy due to organizational and stra-
tegic responses to governance challenges. The second contribution is 
to the debates on the evolution of the corporation. In the sixteenth 
century, innovations in the legal and organizational characteristics of 
the chartered trading companies created entities redolent of modern 
corporations, yet this was an incomplete revolution.28 Legal rights 
and responsibilities of owners and directors remained ill defined, and 
this article illustrates how these governance problems limited opera-
tions and performance.29 This supports explanations that dismiss the 
importance of the Bubble Act in explaining low levels of incorpora-
tion in the eighteenth century.30
The paper proceeds with a brief description of the British economy 
and marine insurance sector in the early eighteenth century. Examina-
tion of the parliamentary inquiry surrounding the proposed incorpo-
ration of the REA and LA identifies contemporary perceptions of the 
different organizational forms and the rationale for the change in own-
ership. Subsequently, the article details the organization and business 
model of the newly incorporated company. It concludes by contextual-
izing these findings within debates on organizational forms.
 26. Pearson, “Shareholder Democracies?,” 852.
 27. Murphy, The Origins of English Financial Markets; Alborn, Conceiving 
Companies.
 28. Gelderblom, De Jong, and Jonker, “The Formative Years of the Modern 
Corporation”; Turner, “The Development of English Company Law Before 1900.”
 29. DuBois, The English Business Company After the Bubble Act, 93; Freeman, 
Pearson, and Taylor, Shareholder Democracies?, 180–182; Harris, Industrializing 
English Law, 129–130.
 30. Turner, “The Development of English Company Law before 1900”; Harris, 
“The Bubble Act.”
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Britain’s Evolving Economy in the Early Eighteenth Century
The incorporation of the LA and REA in 1720 marked the completion 
of a lengthy, contentious debate between merchants, underwriters, and 
the British government regarding the benefits and threats of incorpo-
ration in the marine insurance sector. The debate, and the context 
in which it occurred, illustrate contemporary views of the joint-stock 
form and marine insurance.
The years 1719 and 1720 saw an extraordinary boom in the interest 
in the joint-stock form. More than 44 percent of all the British joint-
stock companies floated in the two centuries between 1600 and 1789 
were floated in those two years.31 In addition to the sheer number of 
firms (at least 160 were floated), what is striking is the number of sectors 
involved: beside the traditional sectors of finance and long-distance 
trade, ventures in marine insurance, agriculture, consumer goods, and 
construction were proposed.32 Although dismissed by some contem-
poraries and historians as a fleeting effect of stockjobbers seeking 
to defraud the unwary public, these undertakings were part of a wider 
experimentation with the idea of publicly owned enterprises.33
Innovation of the corporate form was part of an evolution in the 
“sophistication and specialization of business activity” in the late sev-
enteenth century.34 New ventures were often promoted on the basis of 
expanding business while providing some degree of public utility or 
benefit to the nation. The scale of capital within the ventures incor-
porated in 1720 was unprecedented, with some subscriptions rising 
above £2 million. Entrepreneurs, investors, and capital markets, were 
increasingly connected through these joint-stock ventures.35
Of all the sectors overtaken by the joint-stock euphoria, marine 
insurance raised by far the greatest interest among investors in Britain 
 31. Condorelli, “The 1719–20 Stock Euphoria,” 23. The list of the English 
IPOs is mainly based on Scott, Constitution, op. cit.; and DuBois, The English 
Business Company After the Bubble Act, op. cit. The percentage must be taken 
as an approximation, as this computation has almost certainly missed a number 
of seventeenth- or eighteenth-century IPOs. Yet these would not be sufficiently 
numerous to significantly alter the relative importance of the years 1719–1720.
 32. Anderson, An Historical and Chronological Deduction, [1762] 1801, III, p. 
103 et seq., provides the most complete list of 1720 English joint-stock companies.
 33. John Aislabie, chancellor of the exchequer in 1720, claimed the two 
marine insurance firms were: “founded in greater iniquity and contributed more to 
the publick calamity than anything else.” Quoted in Scott, Constitution, 3:404. 
Bogatyreva, “England 1660–1720: Corporate or Private?,” 198, expanded these 
claims: “The projectors were not aiming to revolutionise marine insurance for the 
benefit of trade and the nation; they were simply after profit.”
 34. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 3.
 35. See Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 5; Carlos, Fletcher, and Neal, 
“Share Portfolios in the Early Years of Financial Capitalism”; Murphy, The Origins 
of English Financial Markets.
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and northwest Europe. In Britain, the two marine insurance corpo-
rations became the two stars of the 1720 stock market bubble, their 
share prices surging to greater heights than the SSC.
Although not entirely novel—with previous joint-stock ventures 
mooted in Holland and Venice—the incorporation of the two British 
firms initiated a craze for marine insurance joint-stock companies 
elsewhere in Europe. In the Dutch Republic, thirty-nine out of forty 
joint-stock schemes projected between June and October 1720 were 
concerned with insurance. According to a London newspaper, the 
Dutch were so infatuated with insurance companies that they “talk[ed] 
of nothing else.”36 During that same time, two marine insurance firms 
were floated in Hamburg, their shares rising more than 100 percent in 
a week.37 Other marine insurance projects appeared in the Austrian 
Netherlands (July 1720), the Danish city of Altona (July 1720), and 
the northern German city of Emden (October 1720).38
The marine insurance craze took place against a backdrop of 
long-term expansion in international trade, with British imports and 
exports increasing by around 75 percent in the second half of the 
seventeenth century.39 There was growing interest from the state and 
among merchants to expand international trade; however, the sig-
nificant risks involved stunted wider participation. The loss of indi-
vidual ships could easily ruin a merchant, while events such as the 
destruction of the Smyrna fleet in 1693 threatened the wider econ-
omy.40 Marine insurance was recognized as a vital element in mitigat-
ing the threats faced by merchants.
In the seventeenth century, marine insurance operated through a 
system of brokers who linked merchants with underwriters. By 1720, 
there was in the region of 150 underwriters in London, the majority of 
whom were individuals who provided the service among a portfolio 
of business interests, often being merchants themselves. The individ-
ual underwriter would insure only a portion of a ship or its goods, 
with multiple underwriters insuring a single voyage.41
In the years before 1720, the networks of merchants, brokers, and 
underwriters were strengthened as locations such Edward Lloyd’s 
 36. Applebee’s Original Weekly Journal, July 23, 1720.
 37. Amsinck, “Die ersten hamburgischen Assecuranz-Compagnien und der 
Aktien-handel im Jahre 1720.” See also National Archives, SP 82/37, c. 108–123; 
Gazette d’Amsterdam, July 23, 1720; Post Boy, July 12 and 16, 1720.
 38. Condorelli, “The 1719–20 Stock Euphoria.”
 39. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 5.
 40. An Anglo-Dutch trading fleet was attacked by the French with more than 
ninety ships sunk and forty captured. In Britain it was estimated to be the biggest 
financial loss since the Great Fire of London.
 41. For an account on how underwriters operated, see Hatton, Comes Commer-
cii, 308; John, “The London Assurance Company and the Marine Insurance Market,” 
127–129; Sutherland, A London Merchant, 43–61.
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Coffee-house became hubs for conducting business. These hubs were, 
however, in their infancy in the early eighteenth century. There is 
also evidence that the marine insurance industry was plagued by 
many bankruptcies, with a reported 150 underwriters failing between 
1718 and 1720 alone.42
The growth in international trade raised the profile and attractive-
ness of the marine insurance industry. It is unsurprising that many 
merchants and entrepreneurs considered possibilities for innovation 
through the introduction of a joint-stock corporation. An intersection 
of interests, including those seeking to innovate financial services, 
and support private and public economic expansion, alongside 
speculative impulses of investors looking for further investment 
possibilities, saw a number of such schemes emerge in the early 
eighteenth century.
The Incorporation Debate
In 1717, a subscription was opened with the intent of raising 
£1 million to act as a fund for insuring ships and goods.43 This 
venture, which would become the REA, had an initial subscription 
of 286 individuals. Similar subscriptions were opened the follow-
ing year for the LA. Both groups applied to the state for a charter 
of incorporation. A parliamentary select committee was formed 
to investigate and debate the arguments around incorporation in 
marine insurance.44
The inquiry occurred in a period of intense political scrutiny 
surrounding the chartered corporations.45 A series of parliamen-
tary debates investigated the role and scope of the Hudson’s Bay 
and Royal Africa Companies. Competing interest groups exploited 
these debates in attempts to reshape the institutional framework 
governing the economy.46 A constant source of contention was the 
extent to which the corporations were seen to support the national 
interest, in both economic and geopolitical terms. Counterclaims 
about the relative benefits of incorporation and monopoly became 
dominant themes.
Between 1717 and 1719, a number of petitions in favor of 
incorporation in the marine insurance sector were submitted to 
 42. Scott, Constitution, 3:400n4.
 43. Scott, Constitution, 3:396.
 44. The select committee had a wide remit to look at other subscriptions in 
life and fire insurance and to investigate the use of old charters for new purposes.
 45. Wagner, The English Chartered Trading Companies, 1688–1763, 170.
 46. Pettigrew, “Regulatory Inertia and National Economic Growth.”
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Sir Edward Northey, the attorney general.47 In the case of the LA, 
initial subscriptions were raised by Stephen Ram and James Colebrook. 
These were heavily subscribed to by significant figures in the London 
mercantile community such as Jacob Eyles and John Lambert, along-
side numerous stockjobbers.48 To navigate the petition through the 
parliamentary process, it was critical to obtain the support of major 
political figures, in the case of the LA these included Lord Chetwynd 
and Sir William Chapman, while the REA was organized around 
Lord Onslow.
The petitions expressed the public and private benefits that incor-
poration would deliver to shareholders, the insurance industry, trade, 
and the British economy.49 A corporation would offer a significantly 
securer organizational base, providing an attractive mechanism for 
investors to channel funds into the industry.50 Increasing the scale of 
capital would expand the capacity of the sector, ultimately increasing 
Britain’s level of international trade.
The benefits of the corporate form were further broken down. First, it 
was expected to provide cheaper rates of insurance, in part by removing 
intermediation (i.e., brokers) from the process.51 Second, transactions 
would be easier and quicker, as a merchant could deal directly with a 
single entity, rather than requiring multiple policies from different 
underwriters. The promoters expected to insure whole ships, providing 
a new and easier service to merchants.52 Similarly, claims against pol-
icies would be settled more quickly, and the corporation’s separate legal 
personality would allow merchants to sue the firm in case of dispute, 
rather than multiple individuals or partners.53 Finally, the petition 
argued that those working for the corporation “will be more diligent 
than single persons, the credit of the corporation depending on it.”54
All of these benefits were underpinned by the large capital base, 
over £1 million, which would ensure all policies could be settled, 
 47. Raynes, A History of British Insurance, 97–102.
 48. Drew, The London Assurance, 4.
 49. Bogatyreva, “England 1660–1720: Corporate or Private?” frames the debate 
as an effort by the proposers to secure personally profitable opportunities while 
presenting the outcomes in terms of the national interest.
 50. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, “Special report from the committee,” p. 30. 
Case Billingsley (from the Royal Exchange Assurance syndicate).
 51. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, Summary of the petitions by Edward 
Northey, p. 26.
 52. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, Summary of the petitions by Edward Northey, 
p. 25. “The insurance will be quicker, there being only one subscriber, which 
will be done at once. Whereas by the method now used … the office-keepers are to 
pick up the insurers here and there as they can.”
 53. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, Summary of the petitions by Edward 
Northey, p. 26
 54. Ibid.
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removing the threat of an individual underwriter being bankrupted 
and unable to meet the obligations.
In response, merchants and private underwriters submitted peti-
tions against incorporation. On a fundamental level, they presented 
the corporation as an instrument of stockjobbers solely interested in 
profiting from increased share prices, with little care for the effects 
on the industry or British trade.55 Three specific arguments were 
proposed against the corporate model. First, it was claimed that the 
existing system managed by expert brokers generated rates lower than 
anywhere in Europe and attracted business from the Continent to 
London.56 Second, the establishment of a corporation would dis-
courage private underwriters, resulting in knowledgeable individ-
uals exiting the sector, leading to a rise in rates and a loss of this 
trade to markets such as Amsterdam.57 Third, it was noted that “a 
corporation has no sense of shame, as private persons have … The 
dispatch of a corporation will not be like that of private persons.”58 
In effect, according to the petitioners, the corporation would, by its 
very nature, be less efficient than private underwriters.
The threat of monopoly was widely debated. Both factions expected 
the corporations would capture the whole market, with the private 
underwriters fearing this would be achieved through monopoly. 59 
However, the pro-incorporation group insisted a monopoly was not 
their aim, and merchants would be free to choose between the corpo-
ration and private underwriters.60 Yet correspondence between the 
two, supposedly rival, corporations, indicates that they acted in con-
cert, presumably expecting to form a duopoly once they had received 
their respective charters. 61 Indeed, private underwriters worried that 
the two firms would lower prices to such an extent that they would 
drive competition out of the market, before raising rates once again.62
The debate highlighted the trade-offs between the effects of organi-
zational forms on business and economic performance. The scale of 
capital, separate legal personality, and delegated management were 
 55. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, “Special report from the committee,” p. 30.




 59. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, p. 21. “[The market for marine insurance] 
may be so managed [by the new company] as entirely to fall into the corporation, 
to the great disappointment of the bold traders.”
 60. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, Summary of the petitions by Edward Northey, 
p. 26.
 61. Strauss, Lloyd’s: A Historical Sketch, 31, 36.
 62. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, Summary of the petitions by Edward Northey, 
p. 27.
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 63. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08760, Summary of the petitions by Edward Northey, 
p. 27
 64. Raynes, A History of British Insurance, 102–103.
 65. Act of Parliament 6 Geo I, 18 (1720). Commonly known as the Bubble Act.
 66. Act of Parliament 6 Geo I, 18 (1720).
 67. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08725C, “Account of shares,” an account of early 
shareholders and shares.
identified as corporate features that could enhance the efficiency 
of operations, leading to lower rates and expanding the sector both 
domestically and internationally. Conversely, the petition presented 
the existing networks of brokers and private underwriters as highly 
knowledgeable and capable of efficiently pricing and diversifying 
risk. Disruption would make the sector uncompetitive. Finally, both 
petitions explicitly addressed principal-agent problems; one claim-
ing the corporation would incentivize diligence, the other noting the 
lack of incentive to act with the “dispatch of a private person.”63 A 
notable omission from the debate, however, was any mention of lim-
ited liability, an issue not addressed by either side.
The initial response by the attorney general toward the charters 
was unfavorable, stating that the potential upheaval in the market 
caused by incorporation outweighed the proposed benefits.64 Yet the 
final settlement, encapsulated in the Bubble Act of 1720, was symp-
tomatic of the range of interests involved in these debates. The two 
corporations received their charters, which prohibited entry of other 
joint-stock or partnership firms in the sector, but with the crucial pro-
vision that private underwriters would remain. However, one of the 
government’s key interests was revealed, as both firms paid it a fee 
of £300,000 and made it a loan for the privilege of incorporation.65 
Still, by June 1720 the proposers were formally in a position to start 
business.
Establishing a Marine Insurance Corporation
The debates established that the directors sought to leverage the 
scale of capital to achieve lower rates and dominate the sector. Once 
in possession of the charter, the directors needed to establish a model 
of corporate governance, a management structure, and a strategy to 
achieve these ends.
The charter itself detailed the key institutions of corporate gover-
nance: a general court of shareholders that elected and supervised 
a court of directors.66 The LA had a diffuse shareholder body, with 
an estimated 570 individual shareholders in 1720.67 A proportionate 
voting system was used to elect the court of directors from among this 
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body, with the court of directors undertaking the day-to-day manage-
ment of the firm.68 Directors were required to hold at least forty shares 
and had significantly larger holdings than the average subscriber.69 
They were elected for a three-year term.70 The corporate governance 
structure and practices of the LA clearly copied other large joint-
stock companies such as the East India Company (EIC) and Bank of 
England (BoE).71
Meetings of the general court ostensibly offered the shareholders 
mechanisms to control the directors, yet effective control over the 
company lay with the elected directors. The separation of ownership 
and control was incomplete, with the directors, rather than profes-
sional managers, directly managing operations. To ensure that the 
directors were able to oversee the operations, the court, which was 
initially supposed to gather only once per month, rapidly decided to 
meet weekly. During the South Sea Bubble crash, between October 
5 and 8, 1720, it even met daily.72 No director, however, held any 
fixed responsibility, with all serving on subcommittees with weekly 
turnover. The subcommittees were required to provide detailed reports 
for the court on a daily basis. The underwriting committee kept 
precise books of all the assurances taken and had to explain why it 
refused any contracts.73
The statutes contained clauses that sought to align the interests 
of the directors with the wider shareholder body. Including an “oath 
of fidelity to the corporation … for the faithful discharge of their 
offices.”74 Moreover, they were prohibited from underwriting policies 
on their own account, taking presents for the “affairs” of the corporation, 
and buying shares of the REA.75
The directors represented various commercial and political interest 
groups. As Table 1 shows, twenty-four of the twenty-seven directors 
 68. Votes ranged from £500 (1 vote), £1000 (2 votes), £3000 (3 votes), and 
were capped at £5000 (4 votes).
 69. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS08725C, “Account of shares,” an account of early 
shareholders and shares. Directors’ shareholdings were a mean average of 2138, in 
comparison to the average holding of 869.
 70. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book of rules, decisions, orders etc. 
relating to the administration and structure of the Corporation, p. 48.
 71. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, noted that the LA followed a 
“standard model as exemplified in others of the large-scale and well-established 
companies of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England” (44); Cholmondeley 
Papers, Political papers, 88, n. 29, Department of Manuscripts, University of 
Cambridge, contains the LA’s list of directors in 1720.
 72. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, pp. 36, 38; LMA/CLC/B/08729/1, 
Opinions of Council, p. 39.
 73. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, p. 9.
 74. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, pp. 48, 165.
 75. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, pp. 35, 48.
14 ALDOUS AND CONDORELLI
Table 1 London Assurance directors’ external connections and level of business 
undertaken through the firm







No. of  
external  
connections






Chapman SSC, ECC Spain Walpoleb 3 2 8000
Chester 0 0 0
Chetwynd MP 1 0 0
Eyles BoE, EIC Turkey MP,  
Walpole
4 5 25,000
Flower Walpole 0 12 2365
Gaultier SSC Huguenot 2 4 995
Hatley North America Walpole 1 3 6900
Hopkins SSC Turkey 2 13 11,110
Hyde North America Walpole 1 9 13,750
Jacobsen SSC, ECC Hanse 2 0 0
Jamineau Huguenot 1 11 15,350
Jones SSC 1 5 1900
Lambert SSC Huguenot 2 9 1299
Lane Turkey 1 0 0
Martin Huguenot Walpole 1 5 2500
Neale RAC Walpole 1 14 14,300
Nelthorpe North America 1 14 7650
Osborn SSC 1 1 500
Radcliffe Turkey 1 1 300
Raymond SSC Turkey 2 2 2000
Richards Spain 1 23 21,870
Snelling LC Turkey 2 0 0
Stratton Turkey 1 1 1000
Vernon Turkey MP,  
Walpole
2 7 11,500
Watchter RAC 1 5 1850
Whitworth 0 0 0
Wordsworth EIC, ECC 2 10 2650
a BoE, Bank of England; ECC, English Copper Company; EIC, East India Company; LC, Levant Com-
pany; RAC, Royal Assurance Company; SSC, South Sea Company.
b Robert Walpole was prime minister at this time.
Sources: LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21; Stow, A Survey of the Cities of London 
and Westminster, Borough of Southwark, 1733; McGilvary, East India Patronage and the British State, 
2008; Bradburn and Coombs, eds. Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion, 2011; 
www.historyofparliamentonline.org; www.merchantnetworks.com.au. Also passim in this text. 
The list of other directorates and commercial and political interests is not exhaustive, but indicative 
of the nature of wider interests held by the directors.
had attested connections to other companies, mercantile groups, 
and political interests: eight directors were connected to the SSC, 
with others holding directorships in the BoE, EIC, and Royal African 
Company. Eight were “Turkey merchants,” with interests in the 
Levant Company and extensive trading interests in the Mediterranean 
and Levant. A further four were Huguenots, with privileged ties 
to France and other French-speaking territories, such as Ostend. 
Three were part of the Virginia–Maryland mercantile lobby, and at 
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least two were closely connected to the Spanish mercantile community. 
Indirect connections were also rife; Thomas Vernon, for instance, 
was the son of an EIC director, the brother of an REA director, and 
brother-in-law to an SSC director.
Two directors were MPs, while William Chapman was a close cor-
respondent of the prime minister, Robert Walpole.76 Interestingly, a 
list of LA directors found in Walpole’s correspondence was annotated 
with ticks, and while the exact meaning of the ticks is unknown, it 
is plausible that they were indicative of supporters or individuals fit 
to run for election.77 Joseph Eyles, who had two ticks, was elected 
in 1722, and was close to Walpole’s administration.
One of the key challenges facing the management of the company 
was to mediate between these various groups and provide a system 
of checks and balances to avoid any one group controlling the firm 
for its own interest. In particular, it was essential to ensure that mem-
bers of the underwriting committee could not take advantage of their 
position to grant preferential rates to themselves or to their factions. 
Clauses in the statutes were designed to deal with possible conflicts 
or deadlocks among the directorate. Any director could summon 
the court through a note in the London Gazette, “and such directors 
so assembled shall be deemed to be a Court of Directors and may 
transact the business of the corporation.”78 This mechanism can be 
inferred as serving two objectives: First, it allowed the court, in case 
of need, to act swiftly by gathering before the scheduled weekly meet-
ing. Second, it prevented a minority from paralyzing decision making 
by simply not attending meetings. Other clauses enabled the court 
to act as an internal tribunal to “debate” the conduct of a director.79
These governance mechanisms, however, offered limited protection 
against the directors repressing the interest of minority shareholders. 
The majority of directors, twenty-one of the twenty-seven shown in 
Table 1, personally insured lines through the LA.80 A number of direc-
tors, such as John Richards and Henry Neale, made extensive use of 
the services, while directors, including Richards, Lambert, and Eyles, 
accounted for the majority the LA’s business with Spain, Ostend, and 
the Levant.
There is evidence that some directors proposed clients to the 
underwriting committee, both in their own names and on behalf of 
 76. Carswell, The South Sea Bubble, appendix A.
 77. Cholmondeley papers, Political papers, 88, n. 29.
 78. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, p. 48.
 79. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book.
 80. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21. It is distinctly 
possible a greater proportion of the business was directly driven by the directors’ 
with lines being purchased by merchants linked to their business interests.
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their wider interests. For instance, Thomas Vernon sat on the under-
writing committee on July 9, 1721, when it underwrote four risks for 
himself, two for his fellow director John Richards, and two for another 
client, Richard Chiswell. Chiswell was an MP, a director of the BoE, 
and also a Turkey merchant like Vernon.81 Vernon and Richards were 
both directors, but they were also neighbors living in Coleman Street 
in London, where a third director, Martin, also lived.82 That Vernon 
personally oversaw the covering of risks for himself, for a neighbor 
and fellow director, and for a fellow Turkey merchant clearly consti-
tuted a potential conflict of interest.
One obvious solution to limit the scope for such conflicts was, at 
least in theory, to ensure that the underwriting committee was com-
posed of members drawn from different groups or factions. However, 
in practice, the committee was plagued by regular absenteeism. In the 
case of Vernon, three out of the five members of the committee were 
absent that day. Beside himself, there was only one other director, 
Richard Stratton, present on the committee. Yet, Stratton was also a 
fellow Turkey merchant and insured his own ships with the LA. His 
presence on the committee exacerbated the potential conflict of inter-
est, rather than mitigating it.
In an attempt to fight absenteeism, the corporation paid 5 shil-
lings to each member of the court or the committees for each session 
they attended.83 The payment was likely remuneration for travel 
expenses, but can also plausibly be interpreted as a mechanism for 
fictionalizing the separation between owners and managers, with 
directors receiving the money to denote and remind them of their 
managerial role and responsibilities to the wider company. Either 
way, it is unlikely that the 5 shillings had a significant impact on 
the directors’ behavior.
The issue of absenteeism became a significant problem for the 
company. Many of the directors simply could not dedicate sufficient 
time to attend to the company’s affairs. Directors such as Sir William 
Chapman, John Lambert, and Joseph Eyles were prominent figures of 
the London business community. Nearly half of the directors sat on 
other boards, with three sitting as MPs, while the majority had other 
significant mercantile interests that made claims on their time. Direc-
tors that held at least two other attested significant roles (director, MP, 
or major commercial interest) alongside their position in the LA can 
be classified as busy. In this case, ten out of twenty-seven directors 
 81. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21, July 7, 8, 9, and 11, 
1720.
 82. The Political State of Great Britain, 20: 459.
 83. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, p. 9.
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were “busy” and unlikely to regularly attend the various weekly sub-
committees that ran the day-to-day operations of the company.84
The underwriting committee, which met twice daily for a total of 
five hours, was particularly time-consuming, and absenteeism imme-
diately became a major problem. In the first week of operation (July 4, 
1720), John Lambert was almost always absent, and when not absent he 
arrived late. Out of five members, only two did not have at least one day 
of absence.85 There were instances when a director never attended.86
Absenteeism not only plagued the committees, but the court itself. 
To counter it, directors arriving more than one hour late, or leaving 
before the end of the meeting, would forfeit the five shillings.87 More-
over, to encourage full concentration on the company’s business and 
avoid distractions, it was “ordered that no coffee or tea be carried 
into the room where the Courts of directors are sitting” and that a 
doorkeeper should prevent any outsider from “interrupting.”88 There 
is ample evidence that these procedures had limited success, and 
absenteeism remained a constant issue. In the most extreme case, a 
director could lose his position; a fate that befell Sir Francis Chester, 
who was absent “without leave” forty days in a row.89
Finally, while there had been no explicit mention of limited lia-
bility in the debate, a regime of pro rata limited liability was estab-
lished in the articles. This made shareholders liable for company debt 
in proportion to their shareholding.90 In the 1720s few constitutions 
included any clauses to limit liability.91 The decision to include any 
such stipulation indicate a sensibility toward the protection of share-
holders. Such a regime, however, clearly burdened larger shareholders—
the individuals more likely to be directors.
Creating a Strategy and Structure
The directors of the LA had an existing model of corporate gover-
nance they could draw on, but they did not have a blueprint for the 
 84. Among other references, Street, The London Assurance, 1720–1920, 22.
 85. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21, July 4, 1720.
 86. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21, June 26, 1721, 
Joseph Eyles.
 87. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, pp. 38, 48; LMA/CLC/B/08729/1, 
Opinions of Council, p. 52.
 88. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book.
 89. LMA/CLC/B/08729/1, Opinions of Council, p. 20.
 90. Freeman, Pearson, and Taylor, Shareholder Democracies?, 181.
 91. Ibid, 184. In the authors’ sample of 25 English firms incorporated between 
1720 and 1789, only three had limited liability clauses in their constitution. The 
authors note it was “probably not until the 1840s that limited liability could be 
identified as the chief distinguishing feature of the incorporated company.”
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organization and management of a joint-stock firm in marine insurance.92 
In the seventeenth century, the joint-stock form had primarily been used 
by long-distance trading companies operating under chartered monop-
olistic conditions. The marine insurance industry presented a different 
market structure and competitive dynamic for which there was no clear 
existing management model for a large joint-stock firm.
In its first two meetings, on June 24 and 28, 1720, the court attempted 
to structure the organization. The subcommittees responsible for the 
day-to-day business were defined: treasury, adjustments, accounts, 
and above all, the “committee for underwriting policies.”93 The firm 
recruited a number of “inferiour officers,” but these had no power 
of decision, performing only administrative duties. One clerk was 
appointed “to keep the shipping ledgers” of the underwriting com-
mittee, while other clerks were responsible for the accounts.94 The 
court also ordered that “lists [presumably of ships], Lloyd’s list, bills 
of entry, gazettes and other newspapers [should] be constantly taken 
in,”95 to ensure that all publicly available information on shipping 
and commercial markets was available to the directors.96
Many directors were experienced marine insurers, so the prob-
lem was not about understanding the business per se.97 The problem 
was how to conduct the business in a corporate rather than a private 
way. The directors needed to implement a management structure that 
would effectively link the court to the various committees—in par-
ticular the underwriting committee—achieving effective policy and 
decision making. The committees reported regularly to the court; in 
the case of the underwriting committee this included reports on lines 
covered, amounts, and rates. It was, however, initially unclear where 
ultimate authority and decision-making powers lay.98
The directorate does not seem to have explicitly stated a general 
strategy about customer acquisition and the best way to leverage the 
advantages of the corporation. The abstract book and minute book of 
 92. Scott, Constitution, 3: 383–384, 387. Although a number of fire and life 
insurance companies had been operating since the early 1700s, such as the Amicable 
Society and Sun Fire Office, they were significantly smaller firms and used a range of 
organizational forms, offering few clues to the large joint-stock LA.
 93. LMA/CLC/B/192/8727A, Abstract book, pp. 9, 38.
 94. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS8727A, Abstract book, p. 31.
 95. Some newspapers, such as the Post Boy, gave daily news of ships arrivals 
and departures. See, for instance, Post Boy, July 9, 1720.
 96. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS8727A, Abstract book, p. 139.
 97. For instance John Richards, a prominent London agent of Bilbao mer-
chants (see Lamikiz, Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World, 
38), or William Chapman, who passed to the London Assurance in July 1720 
seventeen risks that he had underwritten himself: see the beginning of the 1720 
Marine Register (LMA CLC/B/192/MS30488).
 98. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS8727A, Abstract book, p. 9.
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the court contain a plethora of clauses relative to the corporate orga-
nization, absenteeism, and so on, but one looks in vain for a statement 
on strategy, assessing risks, the market, or the competition. A strategy 
only evolved at a later stage, as the result of internal debates among 
the directors. The underwriting committee simply opened for business 
on July 4, 1720.99
The first line was proposed on July 6, 1720, and each proposed line 
was recorded in the marine register.100 The register included the date, 
name of the merchant, name of the ship, point of departure, point of 
arrival, any points at which the ship would stop, the amount insured, 
the premium rate, and the level of coverage. There were also com-
ments for refusing a line or noting factors that affected the rate. These 
data can be used to identify patterns in the geographic coverage, pre-
mium rates, and levels of coverage to reveal the strategic preferences 
of the directors.
Between July 4 and December 31, 1720, 806 lines of insurance 
were proposed. Of these lines, 87 had incomplete information, miss-
ing either the destination, arrival, amount or rate. A further 47 lines 
were refused, and 53 lines were recorded as additional cover on exist-
ing policies. These have been removed but the additional amounts 
added to the original policy.101 A total of 187 lines were removed, 
leaving 619 lines for analysis.
Each line’s departure and arrival point has been categorized into geo-
graphic regions: Great Britain (GB), western Europe, Africa, Caribbean, 
China, India, Ireland, Middle East and Levant, North America, northern 
Europe and Scandinavia, and South America. These data, shown in 
Table 2, found that departures and arrivals to and from British ports 
accounted for 72 percent of all the lines insured in this period. The 
routes to western European ports, with around 39 percent of all lines, 
were the dominant routes insured by the company. Northern Europe 
with 7 percent, North America at 6 percent, and the Caribbean with 
6 percent were the other major areas of business.
The remaining 28 percent of lines were cross risks, or lines made 
where neither the departure nor the arrival port was the company’s 
 99. Daily Post, July 12, 1720. Between July 2 and 4, 1720, the firm inserted 
daily press advertisements that announced the commencement of business.
 100. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21.
 101. Of the remaining 619 lines, some appear to be additional coverage on 
existing policies. However, it is difficult to find a clean method to sort them. In 
many cases the names of the ships and journey details are the same, but the dates 
and the names of the merchants on the lines are different. There are two likely 
explanations for this. First, they were additional cover on the same journey, taken 
at a separate date. Second, they were different merchants insuring goods on the 
same ship. In either case, there is a potential overestimation in the number of sep-
arate journeys insured by the company.
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home city, London. A further distinction can be made between cross 
risks for which the other cities were in Britain and those entirely 
outside GB. Of the 233 cross risks, 60 were to or from British ports 
outside London, leaving a 173 non-British cross risks, or 28 percent 
of all the lines insured. Within the cross risks, a number of routes 
were significant; those arriving and departing within western Europe, 
routes between western Europe and South America, and those depart-
ing from Ireland.
Table 3 shows that across the 619 lines, a total of £423,727 
was insured. The highest single line insured was for £8000 on an 
Ostend–Asia route. The lowest was £25 on a London to Hamburg 
voyage. The mean average was £686 per line. The average rate was 
2.93 percent, ranging from 12.9 percent, again on the Ostend to 
China route, to 1 percent for various GB to western Europe routes. 
Cross-risks accounted for 34 percent of the total value insured. 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the insurance amounts and rates
All policies Total  
insured (£)
% of  
total
High (£) Low (£) Average (£) No. of  
lines
% of all 
lines
Amount (£) 423,727 100 8000 25 686 619 100
Rates (%) 12.9 1 2.93
Excluding  
cross risks
Amount (£) 250,885 59.2 7000 25 645 386 62
Rates (%) 12 1 2.35
Non-UK  
cross risks
Amount (£) 142,212 33.6 8000 45 822 173 28
Rates (%) 12.9 1 4.3
Source: LMA CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21.
Table 2 Geographic location of the insured lines as a percentage of all lines 
insured






Middle East 2.1% 0.5%
North America 2.6% 3.7%
Northern Europe 2.9% 4.5%
South America 0.0% 0.0%
Great Britain 7.1% 0.0%
Western Europe 25.8% 13.4%
Total 43.8% 28.3%
Source: LMA CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21.
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They yielded higher than average rates, with non-GB cross risks 
averaging 4.3 percent.
Within these non-GB cross risks a number of extremely lucrative 
routes can be identified. Departures from western Europe to China 
and India, dominated by ships leaving from Ostend, provided over 
5 percent of the total amount insured, with average rates of 11.3 per-
cent. These were predominantly insured as round trips, with the rate 
encompassing the return journey between Europe and Asia. Similarly, 
trips from western European ports to South America, mostly Cadiz 
and Oporto to Buenos Aires and Vera Cruz, accounted for 9 percent of 
the total coverage insured, with rates of 2.98 percent on the outward 
journeys from Europe and 5.96 percent on the inbound journeys. The 
LA charged higher-than-average rates on these routes and offered 
higher levels of coverage.
There is ample evidence that the LA was heavily reliant on its 
directors and their networks to start and develop its business. The 
directors’ business amounted to 156 lines, or 25 percent of all lines 
insured, for a total value of £152,789, or 36 percent of the total cov-
erage. They also accounted for 38 percent of the lucrative non-GB 
cross risks. For example, Joseph Eyles took out five lines on London 
to Aleppo and Smyrna routes, but the value of these lines was £25,000, 
nearly 6 percent of the total coverage.102
An Evolving Strategy
The directors and their networks represented a precious asset for 
the company, but they did not constitute a captive market: the firm 
still had to propose competitive rates. Pricing of the premiums was 
a major issue from the very beginning of operations. On July 7, 1720, 
the LA “refused” its first risk, a ship from East India to London at 
5 percent; according to the ledger, the company would have taken 
the risk at 6 percent. On July 12, it refused several other ships on the 
same East India route.103
The firm was caught between two conflicting requirements: First, 
restricting the flexibility granted to the underwriting committee, so as 
to limit potential conflicts of interests. Second, being flexible enough 
to be able to compete and gain market share. At first, the board simply 
decided to set premium guidelines. On July 13, 1720, William Chapman 
 102. These estimates do not necessarily account for the business undertaken 
by individuals in the directors’ various networks, potentially accounting for a much 
larger portion of the total business.
 103. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21, July 12, 1720.
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provided a “memorandum” indicating the “main rates.”104 In November, 
the court asked the underwriting committee “to prepare a list of voy-
ages and what premium they think proper on each and make as just a 
distinction as they can between ships and seasons.”105 The problem 
was what to do with these guidelines: should they be rigid, providing 
tight control over risks, or flexible, focused on raising market share?
There is evidence that during the first months of operation there was 
some scope for a competition-oriented approach to rates.106 Around 
mid-1721, though, this flexible approach started to become a more 
rigid policy, with a clear priority given to risk control. The profitable 
Ostend market was the first target of the new policy. Ostend ships 
traveling to the East Indies represented lucrative, but risky contracts, 
as they were considered interlopers by Britain and Holland.107 In June 
1721, the court of directors decided that the underwriting committee 
could no longer grant insurances on these ships without its ad hoc 
permission.108 The English market was the second target. In the same 
month, the court ruled that no insurance should be taken under 42 
shillings percent on the lines between London and other English 
ports, “even upon the best ships.”
Strict limits on the rates were imposed on all lines by the end of 
1721, with multiple examples of policies turned down because the 
client was asking rates that were below the levels that the under-
writing committee could accept.109 However, the company had not 
entirely given up its objective of being competitive, and there was 
still scope for some flexibility. Yet it is significant that control over 
these decisions had been taken away from the underwriting com-
mittee and given to the court. In December 1721, for instance, the 
director David Martin appealed to the court to insure £1000 on 
a ship sailing from Leghorn to London at 30 shillings percent; the 
court accepted, adding, however, that for larger sums on the same 
ship the premium rate should not be fewer than 40 shillings. 110
Besides the premiums, the total amount insured per line presented 
a further policy dilemma. A risk-averse approach was also adopted 
 104. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS30488, Marine Register 1720–21, July 13, 1720
 105. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS8727A, Abstract book, p. 9.
 106. See, for instance, the significant variation in the rates offered on Euro-
pean journeys in July 1720: LMA CLC/B/192/MS30488.
 107. See Huisman, M., La Belgique commerciale sous l’empereur Charles VI, 
126–132. The Dutch East India Company, in particular, seized several Ostend ships 
in 1718–19. See also Kessler, Lee, and Menning, The European Canton Trade 1723.
 108. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS8729/1, p. 152, June 28, 1721.
 109. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS8729, Minute book, for example, September 1, 1722 
(to Alicante), September 5, 1722 (Venice), September 7, 1722 (Denmark and 
Norway).
 110. LMA/CLC/B/192/MS8729, Minute book, December 6, 1721.
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in this regard. In December 1720, the firm took a key decision, when 
William Chapman passed to the underwriting committee a lucrative 
contract for two Spanish ships sailing from Buenos Aires to Cadiz for 
a total of £20,000. The committee, declaring that it was “concerned” 
by the size of the contract, asked advice from the court. The sum was 
equivalent to 2 percent of the firm’s nominal capital: a significant, 
but not an extravagant risk. Yet the Court did not follow Chapman’s 
proposal, and decided instead to underwrite £4,000 on each of the 
ships.111
By the end of 1721, the strategy to exploit the scale of the capital 
by offering large single lines of insurance and low premiums becamse 
difficult to execute. In terms of scale, though, it is worth noting that the 
LA appears to have provided larger than average lines of insurance. 
John noted that the average line among private underwriters was £50 
to £100 in 1700, and double that in 1750.112 Even taking £200 as a 
benchmark, the LA’s average of £686 was significantly higher. In the 
first six months of operation, 115 lines were covered, with values 
between £1000 and £5000, with a further 5 lines valued up to £8000. 
Yet increasingly rigid rules curtailed the freedom of the underwriting 
committee to accept such large lines.
The sources indicate that in its first six months of operations, 
the LA was able to insure a wide geographical range of lines. While 
the majority of the business was in the intra-European and North 
America routes, where high levels of competition led to low rates, 
a significant proportion was in more lucrative cross-risk lines. 
Through the directors’ networks the firm was able to pursue profitable 
opportunities, particularly on Asian and South American routes. 
Why, in spite of these opportunities, did the court of directors 
arrive at the decision to reduce the flexibility and competitiveness 
of the underwriting committee?
Explaining These Outcomes
Contrary to the argument about asymmetric information, the scope 
of the business indicates that the LA did not immediately suffer from 
a significant information deficit. In the first years, before Lloyd’s 
became an information powerhouse, the LA may even have had an 
information advantage over private underwriters. The firm could 
benefit from the aggregation of the networks and knowledge of the 
 111. LMA/CLC/B/08729/1, Opinions of Council, p. 74.
 112. John, “The London Assurance Company and the Marine Insurance 
Market,” 137.
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many well-connected merchants and businessmen who composed its 
directorate, and it also systematically collected all publicly available 
information on shipping and trade. It is debatable whether many pri-
vate underwriters in 1720 would have had access to such a wealth of 
news and contacts.
If the firm did not immediately suffer from an information deficit, 
what then prevented it from capturing a larger share of the market? In 
light of the stated aims of the subscribers in the incorporation debate, 
why didn’t the directors leverage the LA’s key competitive advantage, 
the scale of its capital, to insure large sums and whole voyages? Why, 
contrary to what private underwriters had feared, didn’t the LA also 
use its capital to finance a short-term aggressive pricing policy to sys-
tematically undercut the competition? Why did the directors adopt a 
risk-averse strategy?
It has been argued that the directors never intended to develop a 
viable marine insurance business, and rather sought to use the capital 
for other stock-jobbing purposes or to pay down the government fees 
stipulated in the charter.113 A conservative strategy would have, then, 
been a natural outcome. Yet two factors refute this argument. First, the 
size of the business and breadth of lines contracted in the first year 
indicates that the LA seriously attempted to establish a competitive 
venture. Second, it was a common strategy among insurance compa-
nies to manage their capital proactively through investments,114 a strat-
egy also adopted by other firms in this period.115 In this respect, the 
portfolio of securities and loans does not appear overly speculative, 
and significant capital was deployed in the underwriting business.
The sources analyzed in this article show that the risk-averse 
strategy for premiums and level of coverage emerged over time, on 
a case-by-case basis, as a consequence of the balance of power within 
the court of directors. Despite the attempts to build a competitive 
position in 1720–1721 and despite the availability of capital and 
knowledge, the directors progressively arrived at the decision to not 
pursue the risky and demanding task of capturing a large share of the 
marine insurance market. It is important to note that the court did not 
unanimously agree with this decision. On the contrary, evidence sug-
gests that there were debates between “hawkish” directors (including 
Chapman, Martin, and Neale), advocating a more aggressive approach 
 113. Bogatyreva, “England 1660–1720: Corporate or Private?,” 198.
 114. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance, 73, found that both firms held 
BoE and SSC stocks, and EIC bonds and annuities. John, “Insurance Investment 
and the London Money Market of the 18th Century,” 148–149, found that by 1726, 
the LA had a total of £43,590 in loans.
 115. Wagner, The English Chartered Trading Companies, 111, identified the 
proactive management of securities by the Hudson’s Bay Company.
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focused on higher risk and value policies, and “doves,” advising a 
more prudent course of low risks and steady returns. Through these 
debates, a collective preference for the low-risk approach emerged in 
the court of directors, and likely in the general court as well.
This outcome can plausibly be explained as a function of the three 
corporate governance challenges identified in the article. First, a very 
competitive strategy, based on low premiums and insuring whole 
ships, may have increased market share, but there is no doubt that it 
would have greatly benefited those directors, and their factions, using 
the LA to insure their own ships. The threat of minority oppression 
would explain the risk-averse strategy as a mechanism to check the 
efforts of a small group of directors to use the company’s assets for 
their own benefit.
This possibility was on the minds of many in 1720 and 1721, 
due to the crisis triggered by the South Sea Bubble. Contemporaries 
almost unanimously considered that a “junto” (inner ring) of reckless 
and unchecked directors had been the main culprit for the South Sea 
debacle.116 It is plausible that some of the LA’s directors and share-
holders were wary of seeing a similar junto, possibly formed by the 
hawkish directors, develop inside the firm. Indeed, the widespread 
use of governance mechanisms such as elections and term limits for 
directors indicate the wider concerns with threats of business capture 
and minority oppression. While these mechanisms offered theoret-
ical scope to restrict these outcomes, reality was more problematic. 
Proportionate voting, stock qualifications, and control of the general 
court’s procedures gave large shareholders and incumbent directors 
great scope in controlling access to the court of directors.117 In the case 
of the LA, stringent regulations around risk were important additional 
mechanisms to prevent opportunistic behavior among the directors.
Second, there were problems with the implementation of a com-
petitive strategy. This would have required careful and constant mon-
itoring of the market and the capacity to respond rapidly to changing 
conditions. Although mechanisms to provide oversight and control of 
the underwriting committee through the court were theoretically in 
place, the large-scale absenteeism of the busy directors undermined 
their effectiveness, disrupting the balance of interests and capacity 
to monitor operations. Without delegated management, or directors 
fully committed to the task of overseeing the company, a prudent 
strategy with fixed rates and rules on coverage became a logical devel-
opment to reduce the impact of busy or absent directors.
 116. See Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, 118–119.
 117. Bowen, The Business of Empire, 67–68, discusses the limited rotation of 
EIC directors in the early eighteenth century. Freeman, Pearson, and Taylor, Share-
holder Democracies?, 89–91.
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Finally, the pro rata limited liability regime was a threat to the 
larger shareholders in the event of bankruptcy. An overly aggres-
sive strategy increased the levels of the company’s capital exposed 
to riskier lines, amplifying the potential for such a catastrophic 
outcome. As directors tended to be larger than average shareholders, 
it is logical that some were incentivized to introduce a risk-averse 
strategy and reduce their personal exposure. The strength of this 
argument is limited, however, as some directors clearly favored a 
more aggressive strategy.
The directors experimented with the management structure and 
processes, seeking to balance the need for the underwriting commit-
tee to be responsive while preventing it from being captured by a 
dominant shareholder group. Collective control over insurance risk 
emerged as the best solution to prevent opportunistic behavior. As the 
directorate did not meet daily, collective control could not be achieved 
via timely feedback from the committee and direct oversight. Instead, 
it was achieved via a system of inelastic rules on premiums and sums 
insured. The underwriting committee was kept on a short leash, pre-
venting any single director or faction from acting independently and 
pursuing his own interests during his term.
Moreover, two further issues plagued the committee: first, a lack 
of specialization and continuity because of the weekly shifts in per-
sonnel; and second, chronic absenteeism. The most experienced and 
knowledgeable directors were, therefore, not systematically ensured 
to be present when meeting clients and assessing the risks. This 
restricted the efficiency of the LA’s underwriting committee while 
limiting its capacity to leverage the knowledge of the directors. 
Conversely, overtime private underwriters increasingly benefited 
from network effects derived from the nascent Lloyd’s setup.
Rigid rates and the tight supervision exercised by the court limited 
possible conflicts of interest, but severely reduced the LA’s capacity 
to respond rapidly and meet the needs of potential customers. As a 
result, the underwriting committee, the linchpin of the whole busi-
ness, lacked autonomy. This was a serious drawback in a very com-
petitive market such as marine insurance.
Conclusion
Previous explanations of the relative failure of the British marine 
insurance corporations have claimed the business model of the pri-
vate underwriters, in particular the capabilities developed by Lloyd’s, 
as superior in reducing the effects of asymmetric information, making 
them more competitive. By contrast, this article demonstrates that 
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after incorporation the LA did not suffer from an information deficit 
that precluded successful competition with the private underwriters. 
Instead of an a priori worse business model, the article identifies 
a period in mid-1721, toward the end of the first year of operations, 
when the directors intentionally adopted a risk-averse strategy.
While previous research has noted the great caution with which 
the LA approached the market, it has not provided a full explana-
tion as to when and why this risk-averse approach was adopted. This 
article shows that the strategy was a by-product of efforts to develop 
governance mechanisms to reduce the scope for minority oppression, 
in the absence of full limited liability, and to limit the effects of signif-
icant levels of absenteeism among busy directors on the management 
of the firm. This resulted in a suboptimal management structure that 
constricted the underwriting committee through rigid rules and super-
vision, which severely limited its capacity to exploit the firm’s capital 
advantage and drive the private underwriters out of the market.
Conversely, the nascent Lloyd’s network was given the time and 
opportunity to establish the organizational capabilities that would later 
become so effective in addressing the “lemons” problem. It is likely 
these factors became increasingly important in explaining the ongoing 
failure of the corporations to grow their market share, as the scale and 
geographic reach of the marine insurance industry expanded over the 
century, exacerbating the problems of asymmetric information.
These findings have wider implications for the debates on the evo-
lution of the corporation. The 1720 Bubble Act is generally regarded 
as a major restriction on the proliferation of the joint-stock form in the 
eighteenth century.118 While the act played a role, it certainly does 
not constitute the only explanation. In particular, the Bubble Act can-
not explain the declining interest in the joint-stock form in the rest of 
Europe in the years after 1720.119
The case of the LA supports explanations that identify the post-
1720 decline in the number of the incorporated firms being, in part, a 
response to the inherent governance problems of the corporate form. 
This was a period when investors and entrepreneurs became increas-
ingly cognizant of the governance and organizational challenges of 
implementing shareholder democracies, the decision-making prob-
lems associated with owner-directors, and issues of leveraging the 
corporations’ advantages to compete in diverse industries.
 118. In contrast, Turner claims that it is a “popular yet mistaken belief is 
that the Act hindered the development of the corporate form in England and set 
financial capitalism in England back by a century.” Turner, “The Development 
of English Company Law Before 1900,” 127.
 119. A question raised by Frehen, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst, “New Evidence 
on the First Financial Bubble,” 605.
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Needless to say, further research is necessary to advance this 
hypothesis. However, evidence points to similar difficulties expe-
rienced by joint-stock firms floated across Europe in 1719–1720.120 
The evolution of the Stad Rotterdam, a marine insurance firm launched 
in Rotterdam in 1720, is strikingly similar to that of the LA, with an 
increasingly conservative strategy imposed on the underwriters in 
1722.121 The challenges of governance provide more robust hypoth-
eses than the Bubble Act to explain the decline across Europe, and 
not simply in Britain.
This opens new questions and perspective. The “corporate revolu-
tion,” begun by the institutional breakthroughs of the seventeenth cen-
tury, was far from complete in the eighteenth century. Its completion 
required not only further legal developments, to strengthen limited 
liability and the protection of investors, but also managerial experi-
mentation to identify governance and organizational structures to more 
effectively leverage the form’s advantages in different industries.
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